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1. Belgrade military circles have been very disquieted by the news from London that during the conversations of General Eisenhower with political and military personages of the Atlantic Pact, the opinion has prevailed that an attack against Yugoslavia should not be unconditionally considered as a "casus belli." Up to now, Tito has succeeded in exercising control over the army by telling them that he has concrete guarantees from the Anglo-Americans that the West would intervene in case of a satellite attack against Yugoslavia. Consequently, the situation in Yugoslavia has been profoundly aggravated by the above-mentioned London news.
2. Once this information had reached Belgrade a group of generals, constituted of violent political elements, submitted a memorandum to Tito, affirming that Western diplomacy had double-crossed them, and they insisted that the West should be requested to clarify immediately and unequivocally its attitude in case of a war against Yugoslavia.
3. On the other hand, the Cominformists, profiting by the new situation, distributed leaflets in garrisons emphasizing that the Western Powers had abandoned Tito, and they would not defend him in case of an attack.
4. Yugoslav military circles, conscious of an ever increasing Cominformist influence in the Yugoslav political and military life, have come to think that Tito could be liquidated even without any foreign intervention. Consequently, they are considering the possibility of provoking a conflict themselves, probably with Albania, in which the Western Powers would eventually also be involved.
5. According to recent information, relations between the Army Command of Skoplje and the War Ministry are tense. Because of this when a Bulgarian air force of about 60 planes flew over Macedonia on January 21, 1951, the Yugoslav pilots stationed in that region refused to fly.
6. The Yugoslav government, which at first classified the Bulgarian action as an aerial invasion of Yugoslav national territory, ended by adopting the attitude that it was merely a frontier violation by several Bulgarian aircraft.

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